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Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses.
-Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)
INTRODUCTION
One nondescript evening, Dale Menard waited in a park for a
friend to pick him up.1 When his friend did not arrive on schedule,
Menard looked into the window of a nearby retirement home to check
the time. 2 Shortly thereafter, Menard was arrested based on a
resident's prowler report and held by the Los Angeles Police
Department for two days.3 The arrest was based purely on a
misunderstanding, and the LAPD never brought charges against
Menard. 4 The police did, however, forward his arrest record and
fingerprints to the FBI as part of a routine record exchange. 5 One
misunderstanding culminated in extended litigation to expunge
Menard's criminal FBI file.6 While expungement alone seems an
arduous task, this problem has become even more significant because
of the internet. Menard would have faced nearly insurmountable
hurdles to removing an online story about the incident, revealing an
area of law in serious need of reform.'
This type of misleading information is especially troubling as it
relates to internet publications. The internet makes vast amounts of
information readily available and does not require much expertise or
1. William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7
(1974).
2. Id.
3. ARYEH NEIER, TAKING LIBERTIES 89 (2003); Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 7.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra Section II.B.
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effort to find it.8 This has led to an unprecedented ability to find out
about anyone-from ourselves to random strangers. Menard, for
example, might dread the repercussions if, instead of just social media
profiles, a search of his name yielded information about his arrest and
detention. If charges were dropped or never filed,9 the "publishee"10
may be under no requirement to disclose his arrest, yet an easily
accessible record exists via a quick Google search by anyone who
knows his name. That individual has no control over whether the
information gets updated or removed regardless of how false or
misleading it might be in light of subsequent events. The harm of
incomplete information stemming from this lack of control is
exacerbated by the accessibility of online information.
In contrast to the expansiveness of information accessibility, an
individual who finds himself the subject of online stories about his
arrest or criminal investigation has only extremely limited options.
Extra-judicial solutions range from inadequate to nonexistent. 1 An
individual suing under privacy tort or defamation is unlikely to prove
the elements of the offense, 12 much less survive a First Amendment
challenge. 13 With no realistic cause of action, a publishee is left to
request that the information be removed and is at the mercy of the
publisher to honor that request.
Individuals wishing to protect sensitive or harmfully
unflattering information would appreciate the availability of options
8. Frederick Schauer, Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction, 38 JURIMETRICS
J. 555, 557-59 (1998).
9. The clearest need for a remedy exists in circumstances like Menard's, where an
individual was arrested clearly for being in the wrong place at the wrong time with no indication
of wrongdoing. However, the solution proposed in this Note may also extend to any situation in
which an individual was arrested but the charges were later dropped. Though Menard's case
may provide the most sympathetic case needing remediation, the importance of not having a
reputation stained by misleading reports of past criminal action is strong enough to justify
extending protection beyond the set of clear-cut circumstances to which it would be limited if it
were to apply only to Menard-like situations.
10. In this Note, "publishee" denotes an individual whose arrest or criminal investigation is
the subject of an internet publication, despite the fact that those charges were dropped or never
pursued.
11. See, e.g., Allyson Haynes Stuart, Google Search Results: Buried if Not Forgotten, 15
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 463, 493-96 (2014) (describing Google's somewhat circular and likely
ultimately ineffective removal-request process); Bill Keller, Opinion, Erasing History, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/opinionkeller-erasing-history.html
[perma.cc/3QAY-TTMU] (describing various news sources' approaches to handling removal or
update requests).
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (balancing privacy claims and
free press and finding that a State "may [not] impose sanctions on the accurate publication of
[information] obtained from public records").
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such as removal of the information--or search results that lead to it-
or adding a disclaimer providing updated, and likely more flattering,
information. But though an individual in this predicament would want
those options, any interest in privacy must be balanced against
freedom of the press. 14 Publishers have compelling reasons to publish
information of this type and strong rights that protect their ability to
do so. 15 Thus, it is necessary to consider the interests of both
publishers and publishees in crafting a solution that creates a proper
balance of rights and resulting incentives. The problem with the
status quo is that it tips the scales too far in favor of publishers and
leaves publishees without any meaningful leverage to assert their
privacy interests.' 6
This Note examines the proper balance between an individual's
privacy interests and a publisher's rights in the age of the internet.
Specifically, this Note is primarily concerned with internet disclosures
regarding the arrest or criminal investigation 17 of an individual
against whom charges were never pursued. This focus highlights the
disconnect between the vast amount of information currently available
and the extremely weak protection provided by dated and ineffective
tort laws, which were developed at a time of much more limited
information accessibility. Part I begins by describing the predicament
that a publishee faces in trying to remove or update information under
the current state of the law and explores the competing interests and
rights of publishers. Part II examines the right to privacy as a legal
foothold for publishees' rights, describes how the current legal regime
has failed to adapt to technological changes that greatly expand
information accessibility, and explores two potential solutions to
illustrate the complex intermingling of issues that arise when
attempting to address the current lack of remedy. To begin to bridge
the disparity between the ineffective existing tort regime and the
realities of modern technology, Part III proposes a modification to the
current understanding of defamation and privacy tort law: determine
14. See id. ("In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of the free press,
the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our
society.").
15. See infra Section I.B.
16. As described in Section ILA, "privacy" encompasses both a more traditional "right to be
let alone" and an interest in having any publication contain truthful information that is neither
false nor misleading.
17. The updated torts proposed in this Note apply to persons about whom reports of
criminal investigation or proceedings, which have subsequently been dropped, are published on
publicly accessible websites. This Note addresses publications about criminal infractions because
of the particularly high stakes that come with information of this nature. It does not address
whether this could or should be expanded to other non-criminal information.
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whether a story is false or misleading at the time a publishee requests
the information be removed or updated, potentially long after the date
of initial publication.
The proposed two-part solution-requiring publishees to bring
the offending information to the publisher's attention, then evaluating
truthfulness as of that moment if private resolution fails-will allow
defamation and privacy tort law to continue evolving, keeping pace
with modernity.18 Because the system as it stands is extremely
lopsided in publishers' favor, the goal is simply to begin to offset this
imbalance by readjusting incentives for publishers and providing a
realistic avenue of recovery for publishees.
I. THE STATUS QUO: COMPETING INTERESTS AND THE INTERNET
Determining a proper solution to the predicament publishees
currently face is not a simple one; with competing rights and
considerations on both sides, finding the proper balance is a delicate
task. As this Part describes, both publishees and publishers have
compelling interests that must not be unduly infringed. Whether or
not the status quo struck an adequate balance before internet
publication, the change in nature brought about by the digital age has
repositioned these interests far out of balance.
A. The Publishee Perspective: You Can't Always Get What You Want
Three factors combine to create a perfect storm of potential
embarrassment and hardship for publishees: (1) the relatively
nonexistent bars to placing information online, (2) the accessibility of
that information once it is published, and (3) the likelihood that that
information will quickly become only partially reflective of the truth
as subsequent, unnewsworthy developments are not published. Given
this reality, the status quo does not adequately protect the rights of
publishees.
As an underlying issue, there are few restraints-internal or
external-on the initial publication of information.19 Private
18. The overarching ideas explored herein are the reasons for and possibilities of modifying
the understanding of disclosure torts and the subsequent realignment of incentives, rather than
an in-depth analysis of implementation and remedy options.
19. This Note focuses on private information publishers. Public entities, such as law
enforcement officials, may also publish information online regarding arrests and investigations
either directly or as an information source for private publishers. Though there may be
situations where public publishers could operate under this same framework, their different
interests (such as efficient investigation and enforcement) and restraints (such as due process)
2016] 879
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publishers may put out virtually anything that is true-assuming it
does not run afoul of certain privacy torts-and the First Amendment
offers robust protection to publication of reports that are accurate
when written, which poses a significant hurdle to any restrictions on
the information non-governmental entities are allowed to publish. 20
Publishers may choose to update or remove information voluntarily,
but the simple reality is that an arrest is newsworthy; being cleared is
generally not. Because of these realities of the publication business,
stories written about a publishee's arrest or investigation carry a
significant risk of becoming misleading. For Dale Menard, for
example, an online article may have detailed his arrest-which did
occur and was therefore truthful when written-but the subsequent
development that Menard was cleared and the arrest was the result of
a misunderstanding might not be newsworthy in the publisher's eye. A
reader might be misled by the story detailing only the arrest.
Once a story is available online, a publishee seeking to remove
or update information about his arrest or criminal investigation is
likely to encounter insurmountable hurdles that effectively prohibit
any recourse. The first challenge is that the publisher 21 is likely either
unreachable or reluctant to remove it. For large entities such as
Google, it may be difficult to contact someone who can help process a
request.22 Even if one does reach someone in a position to help, that
publisher need not be particularly fearful of a successful legal action
against him because tort remedies are generally inadequate legal
mechanisms. 23
Furthermore, given the realities of the criminal justice system,
it is not unusual for an individual to be arrested or investigated but
never charged. A significant percentage of felony cases in major urban
centers are dismissed at some point after arrest. 24 Together with
publishers' reluctance to update or remove information and their lack
of incentive to publish stories about predominately unnewsworthy
put them beyond the direct focus of this Note. For further discussion of law enforcement
interests, see Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 8.
20. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
21. For the purposes of this Note, "publisher" refers to whoever controls the website on
which the information appears.
22. Stuart, supra note 11, at 493-96.
23. See infra Section II.B.
24. Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of a Right, in Need
of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755, 773 (2005) (citing statistics showing, for example, that federal
prosecutors decline to prosecute thirty-four percent of suspects investigated for weapons offenses,
thirty-five percent of suspects investigated for violent offenses, and forty-two percent of suspects
investigated for property offenses).
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events such as dismissals, 25 these factors create the potential to place
a large number of people in an unfortunate situation.
B. The Other Side: Publishers'Rights and Interests
While the status quo is insufficiently protective of publishees'
rights, it is overprotective of publishers' rights. Though publishers too
have compelling interests, which run contrary to providing more
recovery to publishees, unlimited publishers' rights harm publishees
by making it too difficult to ensure the public record presents an
accurate reflection of reality. 26 This Section sets forth the rights of
publishers; the necessity of balance regarding publishees' rights is
discussed in Section III.C.
The primary interest on the publishers' side is free speech. In
addition to their First Amendment rights, news organizations have
articulated concerns over restricting the free exchange of information
and maintaining a historical record.27 Preventing the press from
publishing relevant, true information abridges free speech and is
constitutionally impermissible. 28 Thus, requiring the press to keep
silent or remove published material could violate free speech
protections. 29 Furthermore, the public has an interest in keeping
informed.30 News outlets, and information availability generally, serve
to keep citizens apprised of what is going on in their communities and
the world at large, a service that furthers the interest of individuals in
being able "to vote intelligently [and] register opinions on the
administration of government generally." 31
An increase in privacy is at odds with these interests.32 When
publishers are restricted from publishing information, or when
publishing information comes with the risk of exposing them to
liability, less information will be published in the first place, chilling
25. KATHY ENGLISH, THE LONGTAIL OF NEWS: TO UNPUBLISH OR NOT TO UNPUBLISH 4-5
(2009), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.apme.com/resource/resmgr/online ournalism-credibility/
long-tail-report.pdf [perma.cc/LD36-EVPJ].
26. See supra Section I.A; infra Section II.B.
27. ENGLISH, supra note 25, at 4, 15.
28. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 491-92.
31. Id.
32. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 2. For example, increased NSA collection of cell phone data
may aid information gathering that could lead to more successful terrorist-threat recognition,
but it comes at the cost of privacy. Conversely, greater freedom from surveillance would improve
the level of privacy but also make it more difficult for law enforcement to investigate and monitor
potential crimes, which could impact overall safety.
2016] 881
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information exchange and free speech. Thus, a decrease in publication
is undesirable where it unduly infringes on the First Amendment's
guarantee to free speech, or restricts public access to accurate and
relevant information.
C. One of These Things Is Not Like the Others:
How the Internet Has Changed Publication
The internet has fundamentally changed not only the nature of
publication in the modern age,33 it has also changed the publication
process itself. The technical process through which internet pages are
displayed is fundamentally different from a traditional print
publication. When an individual navigates to a webpage, he is not
accessing a static piece of information but instead sending a request
for the elements that form the target page, which the host server then
sends. 34 This technical process means that viewing a webpage is not
like reading a newspaper because the webpage-viewing process is not
static like traditional print sources. In fact, analogizing the online
publishing process to traditional methods would more closely resemble
someone writing something down and occasionally handing it out
every so often when someone asked for a copy going on several years
down the line.3 5
Because internet publication is functionally different from
traditional print media, it should also be treated differently. While a
print-media publisher relinquishes control over the embodiment of the
information when it is sent out, internet publishers retain control and
can update or amend that information at their pleasure. Furthermore,
access to an online news story is much wider than that of a traditional
newspaper. A webpage may be viewed nearly simultaneously by
millions of people whereas print media must be physically replicated
to reach such great numbers. Likewise, an internet page remains
accessible until it is removed, whereas a newspaper is more likely to
be thrown out or archived after it is read. Something initially
published years ago can be called up nearly as easily as if it had been
published yesterday, meaning that the resulting harm is no longer
inflicted only at the moment the information is first published-it
instead occurs every time a person finds the information in his search
33. Schauer, supra note 8, at 557-58.
34. Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work?, STANFORD (2002), https:/web.stanford.edu/
class/msande91si/www-sprO4/readings/weekl/lnternetWhitepaper.htm [perma.cc/5W6T.59LF].
35. I thank Professor Alex Little for this insightful analogy.
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results, whether that moment is five minutes or five years after the
initial publication.
The issues publishees face in the age of internet publication
may seem to be a necessary byproduct of the more efficient
information exchange facilitated by the internet. However, the
problem created is not that people who are looking for the information
can get it easier, it is that internet searching requires minimal effort
and expertise as compared to traditional publication. Before the
internet improved accessibility, a person would have had to expend
greater effort finding information, contacting police departments or
filling out information requests. Now, a person is much more likely to
find the information without much motivation to do so; they may even
happen upon it accidentally when searching the publishee's name.
Additionally, nearly anyone can go to Google and type in a name,
whereas it takes dedication and perhaps even some baseline expertise
to navigate more formal or traditional records-request procedures.
This ability to idly discover potentially harmful stories exacerbates the
general problem of having vast amounts of information publicly
available.
Given the greatly expanded accessibility to this information,3 6 a
publishee should have some way to limit its availability, yet this
would be a nearly impossible task under current circumstances. Both
industry norms 37 and legal precedent 38 contribute to the inability of an
individual to effectively seek recourse. With a strong foundation of
First Amendment protections, specifically the defense of truth39 and
courts' evaluation of that truth only at the time of initial publication,40
publishers lack incentive to seriously consider publishee requests.
While privacy claims generally succeed at a cost to another
societal value, such as free speech, 41 this cost may not necessarily be
prohibitive. Thus, the focus of the inquiry should be on determining an
ideal balance of privacy rights against other interests, not determining
which interest should prevail.42 Then-Justice Rehnquist analogized
36. The rise of the internet has led to a surge in publicly available information, while
search engines have made that information more readily accessible. Schauer, supra note 8, at
557-58.
37. Keller, supra note 11.
38. See infra Section II.B.
39. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
40. Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011).
41. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 2.
42. Id.:
Just as no thinking person is categorically opposed to "privacy" in the abstract, it
seems to me that no careful student of the subject would suggest that the claim of
privacy ought to prevail over every other societal claim whatever the fact situation
2016] 883
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balancing privacy rights to reading supply-and-demand curves to
discern an optimal price. 43 This analogy seems particularly relevant in
the attempt to reconcile an arrestee or criminal suspect's interest in a
truthful public image on one hand with the interests of effective law
enforcement and First Amendment protections on the other. Like
determining an optimal price, this balancing requires "reading curves
representing [an individual's rights] and [publishers'] interests" 44 to
find the convergence point at which the competing interests are best
balanced. Finding this equilibrium requires delicate balancing and
careful analysis of how each change will affect other rights. The next
Part of this Note takes on that challenge.
II. OH WHAT A TANGLED (INTER)WEB WE WEAVE
In evaluating possible remedies for publishees who have been
effectively cleared of wrongdoing, there are a number of (often
conflicting) issues at stake. As a starting point, the ability to do
anything at all requires that the publishee have a right to control
what information is publicly available about them. This can be viewed
alternatively as a privacy interest and an interest in the truth of the
information available.
Once the publishees' right is established, it must be balanced
against the countervailing rights and interests of publishers. While
publishees have a right to restrict misleading information about their
arrests, the publishers have an interest in ensuring the information is
not unduly restricted. Striking a balance between the rights on both
sides calls for concessions that, if not carefully considered and
weighed, might compromise important legal ideals.
This Part analyzes the implications of these various interests
and the way they interact with each other. To do so, this Part
examines the insufficiency of the existing tort regime available to the
subjects of unflattering stories and assesses two alternative schemes
aimed at addressing the problem. The current tort scheme is simply
too outdated to keep pace with the accessibility and pervasiveness of
may be. For those of my generation who can remember back to the days of the
notorious public enemies of the 1930s, I have no doubt that after John Dillinger broke
out of jail at Crown Point, Indiana, and went on his rampage through the Midwest, he
would have liked nothing better than a great deal of privacy .... Certainly most who
remember the incident, and those who may learn about it only through reading of it in
books [or works of legal scholarship], would agree, I think, that any claims to privacy
he might have made during the course of these events should have been resolved
against him.
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id.
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information online. Because a radical shift in publishees' favor would
leave the system just as skewed as it currently is, albeit in the
opposite direction, the goal is finding the right balance, not just
shifting the balance.
A. In the Right?
Finding a Basis for Protecting Subject Suspects'Interests
In order to assess whether publishees should have any recourse
to remove or update internet records regarding their arrest or
investigation, it is first necessary to determine the legally cognizable
interest these individuals have in ensuring that public information
accurately reflects reality. Common law indicates this interest
certainly exists. 45 After all, few would argue that information
regarding an individual's record of having been arrested or
investigated for a crime would not damage that person's reputation.
The first basis for this interest is reputation. A person's
"right ... to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of
the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."46 This interest in
protecting against reputational harm is not necessarily a distinct right
on its own, but is operationalized by state tort law, primarily in the
form of defamation as a cause of action.47 As described in Section
II.B.1 below, defamation allows an individual to recover against the
publisher of harmful information that is false or misleading. 48 This
recovery recognizes that an individual has an interest in protecting
himself against the publication of harmful and untrue information.
Privacy is a somewhat more expansive and nebulous concept
that serves as a basis for publishees' rights. The right to privacy,
though a relatively recent development, was pieced together from old
decisions based on defamation and property rights, among others;
from this patchwork emerged "a broader principle which was entitled
to separate recognition." 49 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
distilled this right in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The
Right to Privacy.50 This right has matured from the core principle
45. Reza, supra note 24, at 792.
46. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
48. See infra Section II.B.1.
49. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 384 (1960).




Warren and Brandeis promulgated to a distinct area of tort law51 that
has expanded to cover areas unimagined at the time of its conception 52
and, in line with the right's intended purpose, 53 continues to evolve.
This right serves as the primary basis for publishees' recovery under
the solution proposed herein.
1. Origins of the Right to Privacy
The early history of the right to privacy reveals the full
applicability and versatility of the right and its suitability for serving
as the basis of a remedy for publishees. In their foundational article,
Warren and Brandeis looked to precedent to support their proposition
of an overarching privacy interest entitled to recognition as a distinct
principle. 54 By the time Dean William Prosser 55 wrote his examination
of Warren and Brandeis's work on the theory of the right to privacy,
there were "very few exceptions" to its scholarly acceptance.58
The particular circumstances that prompted the establishment
of the right are on point for the proposition of this Note. Warren and
Brandeis's article itself describes "the desirability-indeed . . . the
necessity-of some such protection" as a result of "[tihe press . . .
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency."5 7 Warren and Brandeis cite "instantaneous photographs and
[the] newspaper enterprise" as requiring additional steps necessary to
secure the "right 'to be let alone.' "58 The specific incident that Dean
Prosser posits as the impetus for the article was Warren's displeasure
regarding newspapers' extensive coverage, "in highly personal and
embarrassing detail," of his wife's elaborate social gatherings and his
daughter's wedding. 59
The genesis of the right to privacy's establishing article still
proves relevant today. Much like instantaneous photos made it easier
to record and disseminate information near the turn of the twentieth
century, the internet made it infinitely easier to store and access
51. See infra Section II.B.2.
52. See infra Section II.A.2.
53. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 193.
54. Id. at 194-96.
55. Former UC Berkeley School of Law Dean and author of Prosser on Torts, widely
recognized as a leading tort-law scholar.
56. Prosser, supra note 49, at 384.
57. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 196.
58. Id. at 195.
59. Prosser, supra note 49, at 383 ("Mr. Warren became annoyed. It was an annoyance for
which the press, the advertisers and the entertainment industry of America were to pay dearly
over the next seventy years.").
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extensive amounts of data near the turn of the twenty-first century. 60
There is only evidence that Warren and Brandeis intended for the
right to privacy to continue to develop, not to remain static and quit
evolving at the stage of technology and society in which they
promulgated it.61 Warren and Brandeis articulated the need "from
time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of' the
principle of full protection in person and property in the face of
"[p]olitical, social, and economic changes [that] entail the recognition
of new rights."62 Facing such a situation, "the common law, in its
eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society."63
2. Evolutionary Theory: Privacy Roots of Information Restriction
The right to privacy continued its evolution after its initial
acceptance. In the mid-twentieth century, the concept evolved so far
as to prompt a line of cases respecting various rights to be free from
overbearing government intrusion. 64  Then-Justice Rehnquist
catalogued these developments as he examined the evolution of the
right to privacy as applied to arrestees' interest in restricting
dissemination of their arrest records.65 He noted the right to privacy's
invocation in attempts to constrain the preservation and circulation of
arrest records,66 a cause picked up by Professor Sadiq Reza.67
Professor Reza's in-depth search for a right to provide criminal
suspects or arrestees with recourse discusses the source of that right
and instances where that right appears to be currently observed. 68
Professor Reza finds a basis for recovery in a "right of temporary
anonymity" up until an independent, judicial determination of
probable cause. 69 This right, he argues, "is not only necessary to
protect innocent or unprosecuted accusees, it is also compelled by the
60. Schauer, supra note 8, at 557-58.
61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 193.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1973) (invalidating state regulations that
prohibited doctors from performing certain abortions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55
(1972) (protecting the right to share information about birth control devices); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (protecting the right of married couples to use birth
control devices without state interference).
65. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 4-6.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Reza, supra note 24, at 761-62.
68. Id. at 761, 768-95.
69. Id. at 767-68.
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evolving theory and practice of privacy law."70 This evolution of
privacy law is "[t]he essence of informational policy," the right of a
person to control what information about him is disseminated to
others.71
In the context of criminal accusees and arrestees, the right to
control personal information is the right to protect their identity from
association with criminal conduct-to prevent "the very fact of their
involvement in the criminal process" from becoming public
knowledge. 72 According to Professor Reza, this right is nothing new; it
is already embodied in several aspects of criminal procedure73-most
notably, the secrecy of grand jury investigations and restrictions on
arrest-record dissemination. 74 The secrecy of grand jury proceedings
protects accused individuals from being identified before enough
evidence exists to determine probable cause of their guilt. 75 The
purpose of this safeguard, "to protect the innocent accused who is
exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under
investigation," 76 is directly applicable to any individual under
investigation, whether or not a grand jury is empaneled.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized a privacy interest
in preventing disclosure of an individual's arrest records by upholding
restrictions on public access to these records. 77 By recognizing that the
public interest does not extend to an individual's entire criminal
record, even when a crime that individual allegedly committed is of
public interest, "the Court endorsed the idea that individuals have the
right to keep information about their prior involvement in the
criminal justice system secret from the public on common-law privacy
grounds."78 This grants an individual a privacy interest "in the aspects
of his or her criminal history that may have been wholly forgotten,"
although they once were public.79
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 762.
73. Professor Reza specifically describes the reflection of the right to informational privacy
in protections afforded to sexual assault complainants, juveniles, accusees in quasi-criminal
proceedings, the subjects of grand jury proceedings, and restrictions on public access to arrest
records. Id. at 780-95.
74. Id. at 789-95.
75. Id. at 789-90.
76. Id. at 789 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6
(1958)).
77. Id. at 791-92.
78. Id. at 791-93 (discussing U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)).
79. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 769.
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At the core of these protections is the implicit recognition that
the mere accusation of criminal conduct can be harmful to an
individual and that the legal system should protect against this harm.
The fact that the procedures currently in place fail to do so means only
that the right is not properly protected, not that it does not exist. In
the century since Warren and Brandeis introduced their concept of the
"right to be let alone," the right continuously evolved to apply in a
range of contexts.80 This right, along with the reputational interest
protectable by the tort of defamation, must now continue its evolution
to fully protect the rights of individuals against unwarranted trespass
by the proliferation and endurance of information made possible by
technological advancement.
B. The Right that Just Won't Write:
Inadequacies of Existing Tort Remedies in the Internet Age
Two torts provide potential relief for the publishees of
information misleadingly implying criminal activities: defamation
(specifically libel) and privacy law (specifically false light publicity).
However, for the reasons described below, neither tort currently
provides a sustainable cause of action. If an individual were actually
arrested or investigated, the truth of that fact at the time of
publication is a fatal blow to recovery under tort law as it stands,
regardless of whether that fact remains a complete and accurate
description of the scenario as it developed. The current understanding
of each tort prohibits publishee recovery because truth is assessed
only at the moment of first publication.
1. Defamation
Defamation is the first line of defense against the publication of
untrue information about an individual. Recovery requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate that the defendant (1) published (2) at least
negligently a (3) defamatory, false statement that (4) caused special
harm or is actionable irrespective of actual harm.81 "Defamatory" is
defined as tending to harm the reputation of the subject of publication,
"lower[ing] him in the estimation of the community or... deter[ring]
third persons from associating or dealing with him."
8 2
80. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 4-6.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
82. Id. § 559.
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Defamation is further subdivided into the torts of libel and
slander. In the case of internet publications, libel would be the
appropriate cause of action as it covers written or printed words and
other forms of expression that have greater permanence than the
spoken word.83 The significance of internet publications falling under
the tort of libel rather than slander is that libel does not require a
showing of special harm, meaning that a plaintiff need not prove the
loss of something of economic or pecuniary value; the harm to his
reputation is sufficient.8 4 This could be important in the context of
publishees as it might be difficult to prove that they incurred any
specific harm as a result of the publication. For instance, it could be
prohibitively challenging to prove special harm when the injury is only
general embarrassment or the individual has only a suspicion that
employers screened him out after finding information online about his
past arrest or investigation.
Recovery under libel works well for the subject of a story that is
untrue at the time it is published; however, truth is an absolute
defense.8 5 In the case of unflattering information regarding an arrest
or criminal investigation, the information was true when written and
thus the subject may not recover for libel. Additionally, the traditional
understanding of libel does not require a retraction or similar
correction even if grave doubt is subsequently cast upon the
information.8 6 Even if harm initially occurs, it occurs only once and a
plaintiff may not recover for any eventual nebulous harm occurring
long after the initial publication.87 But the internet does not conform
to a traditional understanding of publication. While the historical
application of libel may have worked when a print source was
disseminated once, then either filed and likely forgotten or simply
discarded, this logic does not hold true for internet sources capable of
perpetual, continuous publication.88
The outdated reasoning behind the traditional understanding
of libel is highlighted by the Ninth Circuit case Roberts v. McAfee, Inc.,
which aptly showcases how the traditional notion of publication is too
limited to successfully address internet disclosures.8 9 Kent Roberts, a
former McAfee employee, claimed that McAfee defamed him by failing
to remove from its website a press release describing Roberts's
83. Id. § 568.
84. Id. § 569.
85. Id. § 581A.
86. Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011).
87. See id. at 1166-67.
88. See supra Section I.C.
89. Roberts, 660 F.3d at 1166-69.
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improper actions with company stock options after he was acquitted
by a jury of fraud and criminal charges and the SEC dropped a civil
suit.90 The press release containing these allegations remained on the
company's website for several months after the SEC had voluntarily
dismissed its claims. 91 The court rejected Roberts's argument that this
failure to remove the press release in the face of "substantial
indications of falsity" was tantamount to republication. 92 To support
its conclusion, the court cited the application of the "single-publication
rule," the rationale for which is that it " 'spar[es] the courts from
litigation of stale claims' where an offending book or magazine is
resold years later."93 However, none of the cases cited in support of
this rule addressed an internet publication. 9
4
The reasoning behind the single-publication rule hardly seems
applicable to internet publications. 95 Whereas the resale of a hard
copy is a one-off transaction-a single, tangible print transferred at
one point from one person to another-an internet publication is
constantly and simultaneously available to an unlimited number of
people. Because of this fundamental difference, the current
understanding of defamation under the single-publication rule does
not properly account for the change in the nature of information
availability brought about by the internet.
2. Privacy Torts
There are four generally recognized privacy torts: false light
invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, publicity to private life,
and appropriation of name or likeness. 96 Only one-false light
publicity-seems like a promising remedy for publishees; however, for
reasons discussed herein it fails to provide recourse. This tort requires
that (1) publicity be given to information that is (2) false and (3)
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and that (4) the defendant
90. Id. at 1162, 1166.
91. Id. at 1166; Comm'n Voluntarily Dismisses All Claims Against Former Gen. Counsel of
McAfee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20995 (April 10, 2009).
92. Roberts, 660 F.3d at 1167-68.
93. Id. at 1166-67.
94. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
96. Intrusion upon seclusion and publicity to private life address the publication of
information that is private, which arrest and criminal investigation generally are not.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("[Tlhere is no liability for
the examination of a public record."); id. § 652D cmt. b (same). If the tort of appropriation
applied to merely writing a story about someone, no news would ever be written. Id. § 652C




acted with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the falsity of the
information.97
False light publicity would seem to provide a strong potential
for recovery to publishees since, as its name implies, the tort applies to
representations that create false impressions by implication, not just
explicit statements. 98 While " 'minor errors in an otherwise accurate'
report" are insufficient, material or substantial falsity is actionable. 99
Several cases demonstrate that a publication may still be misleading
enough to be considered "false" even if the statements contained
therein are literally true when taken in isolation. 100  If those
statements are a convenient editing of the full story that fails to
convey the true character of the event, they may be actionable as
false.101
The classic example of literally true statements creating a false
impression is the Tennessee Supreme Court case Memphis Publishing
Co. v. Nichols.10 2 In that case, a husband and wife sued a newspaper
for publishing a story that the wife, Mrs. Nichols, had been shot after
the "assailant," Mrs. Newton, found her husband with Mrs. Nichols at
the other woman's home. 10 3 The clear implication of the story was that
Mrs. Nichols and Mr. Newton were engaged in an adulterous affair
and that Mrs. Newton shot at them upon discovering them together. 104
The story neglected to mention that Mrs. Nichols and Mr. Newton
were not the only people present at the home, nor were they engaged
in any untoward conduct.10 5 By failing to include that Mr. Nichols, as
well as two neighbors, were also present and that the group was
sitting in the living room talking at the time of the shooting, the story
conveyed a false impression regardless of the fact that each statement
was true in isolation.106
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
98. Cf. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing plaintiff to recover
under false light publicity for a true (i.e., unedited) photo published by defendant's magazine
that was "fully capable of conveying a false impression" of plaintiff).
99. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 (1967).
100. E.g., Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978) (holding that
the relevant question is "whether the meaning reasonably conveyed by the published words is
defamatory").
101. Id.
102. Id. Although the plaintiffs in Memphis Publishing recovered under defamation, the
characteristics that make a publication misleading in defamation also apply to false light
publicity. Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2014).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court determined in Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co. that a story detailing the condition of a family
following a local bridge collapse misleadingly implied that the reporter
saw Mrs. Cantrell-the plaintiff and subject of the story-in tragic
circumstances when he visited her home, while in fact she was not
even present. 10 7 The story relayed the pitiable state of her home and
children as an indication of Mrs. Cantrell's difficulty in dealing with
the tragedy, stated that Mrs. Cantrell would not talk about how she or
her family were doing, and described the "mask of non-expression" on
her face.108 The Court held that the story clearly implied that Mrs.
Cantrell had been present when the reporter visited her home as the
basis for his description of her, and thus the story was actionable as
false and inaccurate. 10 9
These examples show that the tort of false light publicity
provides for recovery based on publications that are misleading or fail
to show the whole picture. It is the overall impression of the story, not
the discrete facts on their own, that is assessed when determining
whether that story is truthful.1 0
Thus, it would seem that the tort of false light publicity should
cover situations where a publication does not outright call the subject
a criminal, but implies nonetheless that he may be one based on the
reporting of his arrest or criminal investigation. One of the typical
illustrations of false light publicity is the inclusion of an individual in
a public "rogues' gallery" of criminals when the individual has not
actually been convicted.' In Dean Prosser's description of why this
situation would subject the publisher to liability for false light
publicity, he explains that while "police are clearly privileged to make
such a record in the first instance, and to use it for any legitimate
purpose pending trial, or even after conviction, the element of false
107. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 247 (1974).
108. Id. at 247-48.
109. Id. at 247-48, 253.
110. See id. at 253 ("[The story's representations] were 'calculated falsehoods,' and the jury
was plainly justified in finding that [the reporter] had portrayed the Cantrells in a false light
through knowing or reckless untruth."); Memphis Publ'g, 569 S.W.2d at 420:
[D]efendant's reliance on the truth of the facts stated in the article in question is
misplaced. The proper question is whether the [meaning reasonably conveyed by the
published words is defamatory, "whether the libel as published would have a different
effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have
produced."
(quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 193 N.E. 537, 538 (N.Y. 1937)).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E illus. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Prosser, supra
note 49, at 399.
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publicity in the inclusion among the convicted goes beyond the
privilege." 12
Unfortunately for publishees, false light publicity-like libel-
does not cover information that, while reflective of the truth at the
time of publication, has subsequently become false or misleading. 113
Sticking to the moment-of-publication approach and refusing to look
beyond that instant in assessing the truth of internet publications
seems incongruous with the history of the right to privacy as an
evolving interest. This right was developed to create a remedy against
what was seen as unnecessary disclosure of facts that the public had
no real interest (beyond gossip) in knowing. 14 It built on, among other
things, the existing law of defamation to encompass a situation that
was perceived to need protection but for which the law as it stood
recognized no cause of action. 1 5
That situation arguably is upon us again. The right to privacy
has expanded to encompass a variety of additional situations that
Warren and Brandeis may not have envisioned; 116 it should not stop
evolving at this point. Nor should it fail to cover those who arguably
have a real interest in preventing the disclosure of potentially
misleading and highly damaging information. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts allows for, if not anticipates, the evolution and
expansion of privacy torts, even alluding to the potential implications
of advancing technology. 117 However, while privacy-tort law provides a
promising avenue for development, as currently recognized it does not
allow recourse for individuals who are the subject of misleading
information regarding unpursued criminal infractions.
112. Prosser, supra note 49, at 399-400.
113. Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., discussed in Section JI.B.1 supra, also assessed and refused to
grant recovery for a false light publicity claim. 660 F.3d 1156, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011).
114. Prosser, supra note 49, at 383.
115. Id. at 384; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 196.
116. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 3-6.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (emphasis
added):
Thus far, as indicated in the decisions of the courts, the four forms of invasion of the
right of privacy stated in this Section are the ones that have clearly become
crystallized and generally been held to be actionable as a matter of tort liability.
Other forms may still appear, particularly since some courts, and in particular the
Supreme Court of the United States, have spoken in very broad general terms of a
somewhat undefined "right of privacy" as a ground for various constitutional decisions
involving indeterminate civil and personal rights. These and other references to the
right of privacy, particularly as a protection against various types of governmental
interference and the compilation of elaborate written or computerized dossiers, may
give rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort liability for invasion of privacy listed
in this Section or the establishment of new forms. Nothing in this Chapter is intended
to exclude the possibility of future developments in the tort law of privacy.
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C. Spoiled for Choice: Alternative Solutions
The predicament faced by those trying to update or remove
publicly available information regarding a past brush with the law
has been noticed in both scholarly literature and international
legislative attempts. Two approaches are herein briefly discussed as
examples of how trying to provide recourse can lead to an imbalance
between the competing issues at stake. The first approach arguably
does too little at too high a cost; the second approach has the potential
to do far too much.
1. Law Enforcement Disclosure Restrictions:
Professor Reza's Probable Cause Bar
In his article Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In
Search of a Right, In Need of a Rule, Professor Sadiq Reza concludes
that individuals pursued by law enforcement generally have a privacy
interest in remaining anonymous until a judicial determination of
probable cause. 118 He proposes that legislation be implemented to
protect that interest by "forbid[ding] the public naming of arrestees
and suspects by government officials until there is a judicial finding of
probable cause of guilt... absent a countervailing law enforcement
interest."119 By placing the restriction on only government actors, this
solution avoids any First Amendment implications and in fact follows
the Supreme Court's repeated suggestions to limit disclosures to the
public. 120 This limitation is necessary because once information is
public, the press is free to do with it what it wants so long as its use of
that information is true as of the moment of publication.
121
In the Professor's view, this modest proposal will impose little
to no additional cost;122 however, this claim seems somewhat dubious
as it applies to both the courts and law enforcement officers.
Instituting a requirement that police either seek a judicial
determination of probable cause or open themselves up to liability by
deciding that they have a compelling interest in disclosure will likely
have a greater effect than "exact[ing] no cost at all from prosecuting
the guilty."1 23 Similarly, though federal courts and some states
118. Reza, supra note 24, at 765-66.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 766.
121. Id.; see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) ("State may [not]
impose sanctions on the accurate publication of [information] obtained from public records.").
122. Reza, supra note 24, at 766-67.
123. Id. at 767.
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account for a judicial finding of probable cause, imposing even a
seemingly small requirement that "a judge[] pass[] on a sworn
statement of facts" in "literally hundreds of thousands of misdemeanor
and felony arrest[s]' ' 124 risks creating more than an insignificant
burden on judicial resources.
Professor Reza's observation that "we have long since decided
to protect the innocent in our criminal justice system at great expense
to prosecuting the guilty" is well founded and would seem an
appropriate justification for the costs imposed on the system, except
that he himself admits that "it could be said that the proposed
legislation would also benefit the accusees little, because the
government could easily satisfy its requirements."' 125 Thus, Professor
Reza's bar has two effects, neither of them desirable. First, law
enforcement officers' fear of potential liability could chill productive
speech aimed at investigatory activities before a judicial
determination, such as quickly publicizing the name and photo of a
suspect on the run. Second, if law enforcement officers did seek that
determination, the relatively low probable cause standard would not
pose a stringent impediment and the government could continue
naming arrestees and suspects with nearly the same ease as it does
under existing constraints. This has a correspondingly low limit on the
flow of information to the public and therefore the press, providing
virtually no protection against private publishers.
Though Professor Reza's proposal is beguiling, when viewed in
light of the potentially high costs and relatively minimal benefit
gained, it seems a less-than-ideal solution because it improperly
balances the interests at play. If compared to the ideal intersection of
suspects' privacy interests and effective law enforcement posited by
then-Justice Rehnquist, this solution does not quite hit the mark.126
2. So Far Left It's Faster to Fly East?
The European Union's Right to Be Forgotten
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Professor Reza's
probable-cause bar is the European Union's Right to Be Forgotten. 127
This gives individuals "the right-under certain conditions-to ask
search engines to remove links with personal information about them"
if that information is "inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or
124. Id. at 801.
125. Id. at 767.
126. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 14.
127. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012).
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excessive."'128 Though it may not in practice be as extensively
applicable as it has been made out to be,' 29 the Right to Be Forgotten
still serves as an example of how promoting one goal can come at
excessive cost to another. If it were imported into American law,
giving an individual a more enforceable right to control what
information about him is available would severely infringe publishers'
First Amendment rights to freely publish true and publicly available
information. 130
In addition to running afoul of free speech concerns, the Right
to Be Forgotten is directed at the wrong party; it specifically applies to
search engines as the "controllers of personal data"' 31 rather than the
actual publishers. In American law, online entities that merely serve
as conduits for information are not generally considered publishers of
that information. 132 Even beyond the impracticality of the Right to Be
Forgotten within the United States' legal system, the likely effect
would be to chill not only free speech itself but also the methods of
relaying that speech. 133 Given these considerations, the Right to Be
Forgotten intrudes too far on private publishers' rights in an attempt
to give individuals greater control over public access to unflattering
information. 3 4
III. A SECOND BYTE AT THE APPLE: RE-INCENTIVIZING THE SYSTEM
THROUGH TORT-REMEDY AVAILABILITY
Because the status quo of tort law creates an imbalance where
publishers are relatively free to make potentially harmful information
constantly available with few repercussions, some change is
necessary. Yet that change needs to occur with recognition that
though the latent aftermath of publication is undesirable where the
128. Eur. Comm'n Press Release C-131/12, Factsheet on the "Right to be Forgotten" Ruling
(July 8, 2014), http://ec.europa.euljustice/data-protection/files/factsheets
factsheetdata-protection en.pdf [perma.cc/THF6-PLZY] [hereinafter E.U. Press Release].
129. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Right to Be Forgotten (HBO television broadcast
May 18, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-r-ERajkMXw0 [https://perma.cc/TA4B-266K].
130. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
131. E.U. Press Release, supra note 128.
132. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
671-72 (7th Cir. 2008).
133. The potentially "ruinous monetary sanctions" faced by data controllers, such as search
engines, that do not comply with requests to remove data "could lead data controllers to opt for
deletion in ambiguous cases, producing a serious chilling effect." Rosen, supra note 127, at 90-
91.
134. E.g., Kelly Conaboy, Pianist Wants Bad Review Removed Under "Right to be Forgotten"




information is no longer entirely reflective of reality, the initial
publication itself may be desirable based on free speech and
information-sharing concerns. Therefore, the ideal solution should not
place an undue burden on publishers, which would create a chilling
effect on what might be useful information. The solution should
instead provide publishers with an incentive to be mindful of the harm
inflicted on the subjects of their stories when those stories become
misleading. The law needs to remedy the disintegrating truthfulness
of a story, not its initial publication.
The torts of false light publicity and defamation would be the
likely remedies for an individual about whom a misleading story of
arrest or suspicion of criminal activity was published. However, as
described above, an individual who was actually arrested or
investigated would be unable to recover under those theories as
currently construed, even if he was eventually cleared. 1 5 Although
these torts as currently understood are insufficient as a
counterbalance to this type of publication, they are established causes
of action that, with a slight modification in understanding, would
provide an enforcement mechanism to publishees and an adequate
balance to the system. Much like Warren and Brandeis pieced
together bits of precedent to find an underlying right to privacy, the
building blocks to support the solution proposed herein already exist.
This Note's proposal comprises two slight modifications to the
existing tort regime-(1) requiring a publishee to attempt to resolve
the issue with the publisher, and (2) assessing the truth of the
publication at the time that request was made. This Part describes the
proposal and outlines how this modification best balances publishers
and publishees' rights.
A. Proposed Changes to Interpreting Tort Liability
The two-prong modification proposed would work within the
current tort system to provide an appropriate balance without pushing
the publisher-favoring status quo too far in the opposite direction.
First, publishees who believe a story about them no longer reflects the
truth must attempt to contact the publisher directly and work out a
mutually agreeable solution. 13 6 Second, should that attempt fail and
135. See supra Section 1J.B.2 (describing how limitations of existing torts preclude a plaintiff
from succeeding against the publisher of information that was not libelous or did not place the
plaintiff in a false light before the public when the information was originally published).
136. What exactly would be required to demonstrate a failure to resolve the issue would be
an important component of implementation. This case-by-case determination is the type of
factual inquiry for which juries are ideally suited. The finer logistical points of this
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the publishee be required to bring suit, whether the publication is
misleading will be assessed as of the time of the publishee's request to
remove, alter, or update the information rather than at the moment of
initial publication. These two prongs work together to ensure that
publishees have some leverage against publishers, where little to none
currently exists, but not so much that the fear of liability chills speech
or infringes upon publishers' rights.
1. Require Publishees to Attempt to Resolve
the Issue with the Publisher
Under this proposal's first prong, publishees would recover only
after showing that attempts to resolve the dispute directly with the
publisher have failed to result in a compromise. This incentivizes
mutually agreeable solutions, relieves some of the burden on courts
from expanding recovery, and gives publishers the most control over
their own content-they can choose to remove it, amend it, add a
disclaimer, or simply refuse to institute any change if they believe the
publication still accurately reflects the truth. Further, it puts the onus
on the publishee to monitor his online presence and seek out negative
information rather than requiring publishers to constantly monitor for
any potential developments in stories that could become misleading.
This is ideal as the publishee is far more incentivized to pay attention
to information about himself online.
The archetypal application would be to the originating
publishers of the material (the online news source) rather than the
websites and search engines that help an individual access the
information's host. Under defamation, republishers are held liable so
long as they were at least negligent in passing the information
along.137 However, a mere intermediary in the conveyance of
information from one place to another is not a republisher and does
not meet the negligence standard. 138 A search engine algorithm would
seem to be the digital equivalent of that intermediary, and therefore it
would not qualify as a republisher.
determination-such as how much time publishers should have to respond, what should happen
if the publishee finds the publisher's resolution unsatisfactory, and what a publishee must do to
prove the misleading nature of the information-are beyond the scope of this Note.




2. Assess Truth at the Time of the Request to Remove or Modify
Under this proposal's second prong, the falsity of the
information should be evaluated at the time a publishee requests that
it be withdrawn or amended. 139 Looking to the truth of the story at the
time of the request-rather than at the time of publication-allows for
an assessment that properly accounts for changed circumstances. This
simply means that a story can, at time two, be considered misleading
even if it accurately reflected the truth when published at time one.
This does not require that the truth "change." 140 Individuals whose
records are expunged or erased would not win a challenge to a story
reporting their arrest simply because that arrest was expunged. 141
Erasure is a legal fiction, not a historical fact.142 However, individuals
with expunged or erased records can still claim that the stories are
misleading given subsequent events. The misleading nature of the
story-not the court-ordered record purge-would serve as grounds for
tort recovery under this solution.
The main benefit of this approach is to problematize the
current strategy of many news outlets that refuse to take down stories
of past arrests and criminal investigations-claiming that the
reporting was true at the time it was written.1 43 By shifting the inquiry
to look at the time the publishee made the request, courts can more
accurately assess whether the article at issue reflects the current
truth. This is desirable, especially in the criminal context, because it is
the incomplete nature of the publication that makes it damaging, and
so looking at truthfulness at this later point in time reflects
subsequent developments. While it may be true that an individual was
investigated, it may also be true that they were later cleared of all
wrongdoing. Without this second piece of information, the first is
potentially misleading and incredibly damaging. There is a very wide
range of truthfulness from absolutely still true to absolutely false in
light of changed circumstances. Where publishers have access to
updated information, and are effectively republishing a story every
139. While a publication date can vaguely signal that the story may not reflect the most
current information, a story saying that an individual is under investigation or has pending
criminal proceedings, without an update on the status of the investigation or proceedings, is
potentially misleading. Even if the date indicates the investigation or proceedings happened
some time ago, it does not necessarily suggest subsequent developments.
140. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 550-53 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40
(2015) ("The [newspaper] story without an update may not be as complete as [plaintiff] would
like, but it implies nothing false about her.").
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Keller, supra note 11.
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time someone views the webpage, 144 it makes sense for the standard to
require the publisher to disclose information such that the story does
not mislead the reader by describing the circumstances incompletely.
Admittedly, this creates a potentially significant grey area
between absolute falsity and absolute truth. But case law on
defamation and privacy torts already deals with these
indeterminacies, and is capable of continuing to do so. Further, juries
are capable arbiters of whether a publication is too far removed from
the truth. 145 Whether a story is misleading in light of subsequent
developments is a question of fact for the jury;146 sending this type of
question to them best allows for a flexible parsing of the middle
ground between fact and fiction. It is an issue that an already
intensely fact-based inquiry is capable of taking on.
3. Applying the New Standard
Applying these changes would be a relatively minor adjustment
to how defamation and privacy-tort cases generally progress.
However, they would give publishees a greatly improved chance of
succeeding in updating or removing misleading information, or at
least a more realistic path for recourse. Under the current
understanding of the relevant torts, it is difficult for a publishee to
even get before a jury, which can assess whether the publication is
misleading. 147 Under the updated understanding, publishees would be
significantly more likely to survive a pretrial motion to dismiss or
motion for summary judgment.
The elements of defamation and privacy tort have much in
common. 148  The updated understanding would apply similarly
regardless of which theory the publishee pursued. After satisfying the
first prong by attempting to resolve the issue directly with the
publisher, a publishee would easily satisfy the elements of both
144. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
145. See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining
whether a "[negative] implication can reasonably be drawn from the publication" is an issue for a
jury to decide).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Martin, 777 F.3d at 548 (upholding a grant of summary judgment for
publisher defendant).
148. As the Restatement of Torts explains: "In many cases to which [false light publicity]
applies, the publicity given to the plaintiff is defamatory, so that he would have an action for
libel or slander .... In such a case the action for invasion of privacy will afford an alternative or
additional remedy, and the plaintiff can proceed upon either theory, or both." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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defamation 149 and false light publicity. 150 A publishee could meet the
publicity and culpability requirements of each tort 151 with relative
ease, given the nature of internet publication and the requirement
that the publishee first bring the information to the publisher's
attention. Making information available to anyone in the world with
access to the internet clearly meets the standard of publicity.152 If the
publishee has explicitly told the publisher that the information is
untrue in a believable and verifiable manner, continuing to display it
as truthful constitutes acting in reckless disregard, if not with
knowledge, of the information's falsity.1 53 That the information
published is defamatory1 54 and highly offensive to the reasonable
person1 55 is effectively a given when the subject matter implicates
criminal wrongdoing. Publishees need not worry about the special-
harm element of defamation because written words qualify as libel, for
which the special harm requirement is waived. 156 Thus, with these two
slight modifications, publishees would have a much more substantial
chance of success.
B. Tort Law as the Ideal Framework for
Publishees' Rights Enforcement
Tort law, especially as explained under economic theory,
operates by creating effects that incentivize certain behaviors while
discouraging others. 157 This incentive-based approach, combined with
the evolutionary capabilities of common-law tort to expand "to meet
the demands of society," 158 makes it the ideal theory under which to
promote publishees' rights and rebalance the system.
An economic approach to tort law emphasizes that "law creates
incentives for parties to behave efficiently,"159 and thus this approach
149. Id. § 558.
150. Id. § 652E.
151. Id. §§ 558, 652E.
152. Id. § 652E cmt. a (incorporating the § 652D cmt. a definition of publicity: "[T]he matter
is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge"). Publication for
defamation requires only that the defamer tell "one other than the person defamed." Id. § 577.
153. Id. §§ 558, 652E.
154. Id. § 558 cmt. f.
155. Id. § 652E cmt. c.
156. Id. §§ 568-69.
157. Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1989) (book
review).
158. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 193.
159. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
312 (1987).
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tries to find mechanisms that encourage entities on both sides of
competing interests to act in ways that achieve the best outcome. An
effective tort regime provides a mechanism to force potential injurers
to internalize the costs of their actions, incentivizing them to "perceive
both the costs and benefits" of their actions "and behave
accordingly." 160 These incentives promote cost-avoidance behavior, but
that behavior is desirable only to a certain extent. 161 Thus, an interest
should be promoted only so far as its benefits outweigh its costs. 162
Applied to the situation at hand, this means that publishees' rights
should be increased only as far as the benefit to those rights outweighs
the cost to publishers' rights. 163
The efficient outcome in balancing publishees' rights against
publishers' is one where each side is able to effectively promote its
interests and neither is left without any mechanism to enforce its
respective rights. The threat of a viable lawsuit gives publishers an
incentive to assuage publishees' concerns without involving the courts.
This in turn helps address concerns regarding free speech implications
and not editing the historical record, while simultaneously increasing
the chances that the published information most accurately reflects
the full truth.
The evolutionary capability of tort law is ideally suited for the
changing times and technology we face. As technology advances, the
threat to privacy interests likely will as well. Rooting the enforcement
of this right in a more flexible legal scheme will allow it to keep pace
with society's needs.
C. A Better Balance Between Publishers and Publishees' Rights
In addition to providing publishees with a means of recovery,
the updated understanding of defamation and privacy tort proposed in
this Note better balances the interests of both publishees and
publishers because it creates incentives for publishers to consider the
costs of publication to the subjects of their stories. The possibility of a
suit would encourage publishers to weigh the costs and benefits of
refusing to remove or update information that no longer fully reflects
reality. Requiring publishers to internalize the cost of continuing to
display misleading criminal information would prompt them to
160. Sykes, supra note 157, at 1155-56.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The goal is to find the point where the ideal importance of these rights intersect,
described by then-Justice Rehnquist as analogous to supply-and-demand curves. Rehnquist,
supra note 1, at 14.
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consider the harm to publishees and publish misleading criminal
information only if the benefits outweighed the costs.
Allowing publishees to recover under the proposed
modifications is necessary to achieve this rebalancing. Cases brought
by publishees under the current understanding are essentially
nonstarters. 64 Publishers have no legal incentive not to act
accordingly. If cases like this are given the opening they need to get to
a jury and offer plaintiffs a real chance to have their claims heard, as
well as effective bargaining leverage, publishers will change their
policies accordingly. Under this modified understanding, publishees'
pleas will no longer fall on deaf ears, and publishers will likely take a
more considerate approach to the requests they receive to remove or
modify information. Thus, the balance between publishers and
publishees' rights can become more even. The point of this solution is
not to give publishees an unbounded right to remove any crime-
related information from the internet. Rather, the point is to give
them a foot in the door, where in the current situation the door is fully
shut and bolted against them (save for a sympathetic publisher who
voluntarily unlocks it).
The more expansive possibility of recovery for publishees is
limited by requiring them to first attempt to let the publisher resolve
the situation. A solution that required publishers to seek out and
preemptively remedy stories that had become misleading would
potentially impose a tremendous cost, especially on smaller
publishers. This would quite possibly in turn prevent many initial
publications of useful information for fear that it might eventually
become misleading. Allowing publishers the first chance to address
misleading information would also allow them to control or limit their
editing of the historical record while increasing the chances that the
information most accurately reflects the current state of affairs.165
If this solution appears superficially similar to the European
Union's Right to Be Forgotten,' 66 its significantly narrowed
application prevents it from having similarly extensive drawbacks.
The Right to Be Forgotten, analogizing to potential application in the
United States, seems to rely solely on an individual's privacy interest
in shaping his public image, regardless of truth or falsity. 16 7 While the
proposed reassessment of tort remedies also stems from a similar
164. See supra Section II.B.
165. Sarah A. Downey, Online, You are Guilty Even After Being Proven Innocent, THE
ONLINE PRIVACY BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://www.abine.com/blog/2011/online-guilty-before-
proven-innocent/ [perma.cc/2KTA-UPL7].
166. Discussed in Section II.C.2 supra.
167. E.U. Press Release, supra note 128.
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privacy interest, it protects that interest by allowing an updated
assessment of whether the information is misleading. A story that still
objectively relays the truth of a situation-for example, that an
individual was arrested but charges were never filed-would not
subject the publisher to liability. The publication becomes actionable
only under circumstances that do not fully reflect subsequent
developments-for instance, a story describing an individual's arrest
that made no mention of the fact that charges were never filed or the
arrest was made in error. What makes a publication actionable under
the updated understanding of tort remedies is that it no longer reflects
the truth of the situation, not that it is unflattering to the plaintiff.
This is distinct from the understanding of the Right to Be Forgotten,
which allows a much more extensive right to control content, whether
it reflects the truth or not.168
This solution does not necessarily aim to allow publishees to
remove any unflattering stories about criminal investigation, but
rather to exercise their interest in making sure that publicly available
information reflects the truth. Given the new nature of information
availability as a result of the internet, publishees should have some
recourse to make sure that stories about them reflect a holistically
accurate picture of events rather than a literal but misleading truth of
what happened at one point in time. The archetypical application is to
a story that, if written under the circumstances at the time the
publishee gave notice to the publisher, would fall under libel or false
light publicity. While a story may have been true to the best of the
publisher's knowledge at the time it was written, subsequent
developments may make the actual content or impression of that story
untrue.
168. The solution proposed in this Note does not provide publishees with a right to remove
any absolutely true but unflattering or outdated information from the internet. It simply
provides them with some recourse to reshape a misleading public portrayal and better balances
the incentives of the system, which at present are overly skewed toward publishers' ability to




An innocent person who nonetheless has misleading
information about a past arrest or criminal investigation published
poses a sympathetic plight. One might instinctually want to give him
the best chance at a clean slate. Yet the conflicting interests at stake
preclude an easy solution. As then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out, "[I]n
most situations in which claims to privacy are urged, there are two
sides to the issue, and, if the balance is struck in favor of 'privacy,'
some other societal value will suffer." 169 The task of finding the ideal
balance of interests has become more difficult in light of the increase
in both the availability and accessibility of information due to the
development of the internet.
Any solution trying to balance the fundamentally important
interests of privacy, public information, and free speech is prone to
finding an imperfect balance at the cost of one or more of these
interests. One cannot be improved without cost to another. But the
status quo faced by the subjects of stories misleadingly implicating
them in criminal activities is severely unbalanced and must be
realigned in light of the realities of the internet age, even at a slight
cost to competing interests.
Given the change in nature of internet publication, the laws
developed for print journalism cannot and should not apply wholesale
to digital media. The problem has changed170 and the solution must
also change to bridge the gap between the rights the law purports to
protect and the mechanisms available to protect those rights. But the
wheel need not be reinvented; adding a couple more spokes should
efficiently redistribute information-publishing incentives by providing
publishees with a realistic cause of action and strengthening the
structural integrity of the system as a whole. The changes proposed in
this Note interact with each other and the existing tort regime in an
important way-they push the status quo without moving it too far in
the opposite direction. Avoiding this pendulum swing is important to
respecting rights on both sides of the issue. This Note's solution aims
not to give publishees the ability to force publishers to remove any
unflattering information, but instead to give publishees some leverage
where none currently exists.
Revitalizing existing tort remedies would adjust the scales in
publishees' favor without completely upsetting the balance against
free speech and law enforcement interests. Tort law addresses the
169. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 2.
170. Schauer, supra note 8, at 557-59.
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incentives of parties to act in ways that accord with our concept of how
people should act and better balance individuals' rights. These rights
necessarily compete with each other in a complex society, and there is
a better chance of reaching a beneficial balance if both sides hold some
force. Without some teeth on both sides of the equation, the incentives
cannot achieve this aim. An expansion in a publishee's ability to
recover for the detrimental effects of misleadingly outdated
information would provide some bite to his bark and help rebalance
the system.
Laura K McKenzie*
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